- Attackers tamper with WDAC (SiPolicy.p7b and DeviceGuard) to silence EDR and Defender.
- Key indicators: Changes in WDAC keys and hashes associated with active campaigns.
- Mitigation: Change control, signatures, tamper protection, telemetry, and patches.
- Well-managed WDAC protects HoloLens/WAC; poorly managed, it opens the door to fileless/LOLBins.
Attacks that manipulate Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) have become a serious way to disable defenses like EDR and Microsoft Defender in corporate environments. This trend is not science fiction: researchers have observed how threat groups alter code integrity to prevent security drivers and services from loading at boot time.
Beyond the headlines, understanding how WDAC works and what signals it leaves is key to preventing SOCs and response teams from being caught in the dark. This analysis focuses on WDAC manipulation techniques, practical indicators, and mitigation measures , but also on the legitimate use of WDAC (for example, in HoloLens 2 or Windows Admin Center), as well as its relationship with fileless threats and the abuse of PowerShell and LOLBins.
What are WDAC manipulation attacks?
WDAC is Windows' application control technology that restricts which binaries, scripts, MSI installers, and even kernel-level code are allowed to run. Essentially, it establishes code integrity policies based on signatures, publishers, hashes, paths, catalogs, and more, using an allowlist approach.
Adversaries have learned to turn that logic on its head: when they gain sufficient privileges, they alter or deploy WDAC policies to specifically block security components ( EDR drivers and binaries, including Microsoft Defender), thereby reducing visibility and defensive responsiveness before making a move with additional payloads.
What's happening and how they operate
The observed technique involves modifying the code integrity policy so that security services and drivers are not loaded during startup. The key point is usually the SiPolicy.p7b policy file, which Windows places in 'C:\Windows\System32\CodeIntegrity\'.
By altering this file or forcing the use of an alternative policy, an attacker can introduce blocking rules against known EDR paths and drivers (e.g., CrowdStrike, SentinelOne, Symantec, Tanium) and against Microsoft Defender Endpoint itself . This drastically lowers the bar for defense, creating an opportunity to operate with a lower probability of detection.
In addition to file modifications, there are registry signs worth monitoring. Specifically, changes in Windows DeviceGuard to the 'ConfigCIPolicyFilePath' and 'DeployConfigCIPolicy' keys can indicate unauthorized deployment of WDAC policies or their manipulation for malicious purposes.
Another common operational method is the use of decoys: seemingly innocuous documents (such as supposed 'PDFs') have been observed that are actually WDAC binaries designed to silently apply malicious policies , achieving persistence and progressive deactivation of defenses.
From the Krueger Project to the DreamDemon threat
This evolution is notable for the leap from a proof-of-concept tool called Krueger, written in .NET, to a more mature family called DreamDemon, reimplemented in C++ for greater efficiency and resilience . While Krueger demonstrated feasibility, DreamDemon automates and hardens WDAC policy modification techniques in real-world environments.
DreamDemon's objective is clear: to modify WDAC to prevent the loading of services and drivers from multiple security vendors, including the Microsoft Defender ecosystem. With the sensors disabled, the attacker reduces friction before executing additional payloads, moving laterally, or exfiltrating data with less chance of being detected.
Indicators and signs to watch out for
The telemetry associated with this activity has shared SHA-256 hashes that security teams can use for search points and operational intelligence. Here are two examples of relevant linked IoCs :
- 90937b3a64cc834088a0628fda9ce5bd2855bedfc76b7a63f698784c41da4677
- a795b79f1d821b8ea7b21c7fb95d140512aaef5a186da49b9c68d8a3ed545a89
Beyond IoCs, it's advisable to monitor 'Code Integrity' and DeviceGuard events, and set alerts for changes in 'ConfigCIPolicyFilePath' and 'DeployConfigCIPolicy' . Detecting WDAC policy deployments outside of a change process, or at atypical times, is a red flag.
It's also worth paying attention to attachments or downloads of supposed documents that actually enforce malicious WDAC policies . This pattern fits with campaigns that seek to persist and silence defenses to pave the way for larger threats, such as ransomware.
Repercussions for companies and administrations
If an attacker manages to prevent EDR and Defender from loading, the environment falls into a kind of operational blackout: visibility is reduced, correlations and response capabilities are weakened, and the risk of lateral movement, exfiltration, and encryption increases . For a SOC, this is, quite literally, a game-changer.
Krueger's move to DreamDemon demonstrates that techniques against WDAC have matured and become industrialized. Therefore, it is now critical to increase observability over the endpoint chain of trust, implement code integrity telemetry, and close policy management gaps.
Recommendations and mitigation
As a preventative measure, the first step is to strengthen change control over WDAC and Defender, and to understand how to secure Windows . Make sure to version, review, and validate signatures/authorship before applying any SiPolicy.p7b or supplementary policy , and safeguard the deployment pipeline to ensure that only trusted sources are used.
- Restrict administrator privileges and require MFA for security tasks and policy deployment, reducing the surface for abuse. privileged credentials.
- Audit and alert on DeviceGuard modifications (especially 'ConfigCIPolicyFilePath' and 'DeployConfigCIPolicy') and code integrity events.
- Enable and verify Microsoft Defender Tamper Protection on all endpoints to avoid local manipulations.
- Harden EDR/AV: controlled allowlists, blocking unsigned drivers, and recurring rule review.
- Prioritize Windows and application updates: Patches and detections improve resilience against emerging techniques.
- User training: Be especially cautious with unexpected attachments and supposed PDFs; always verify the source.
WDAC on HoloLens 2: App control without confusing it with kiosk mode
On HoloLens, WDAC allows you to block applications from launching . Unlike kiosk mode (which hides apps but allows them to launch), with WDAC you can see them but not run them. Furthermore, a device can have multiple WDAC policies, and if they conflict, the most restrictive one takes precedence.
To create rules, many administrators use PowerShell and Microsoft Intune. A typical first step is to locate the app's package name with something like 'Get-AppxPackage -name *name*'. For example, for Edge, running 'Get-AppxPackage -name *edge*' might return several results , and you can identify the exact name from that list.
In cases where the package name is not obvious, it's advisable to repeat the query with different approaches until the correct string is found . Once identified, the corresponding rule is added to the policy (newPolicy.xml) or via the wizard.
For pre-installed and commonly used apps on HoloLens 2, these are examples of package family names that are typically included in rules (representative extract):
| Application | PackageFamilyName |
|---|---|
| 3D viewer | Microsoft.Microsoft3DViewer_8wekyb3d8bbwe |
| App Installer | Microsoft.DesktopAppInstaller_8wekyb3d8bbwe |
| Calendar / Mail | microsoft.windowscommunicationsapps_8wekyb3d8bbwe |
| Camera | HoloCamera_cw5n1h2txyewy |
| Feedback Hub | Microsoft.WindowsFeedbackHub_8wekyb3d8bbwe |
| Microsoft Store | Microsoft.WindowsStore_8wekyb3d8bbwe |
| Movies & TV | Microsoft.ZuneVideo_8wekyb3d8bbwe |
| OneDrive | microsoft.microsoftskydrive_8wekyb3d8bbwe |
| Photos | Microsoft.Windows.Photos_8wekyb3d8bbwe |
| Configuration | HolographicSystemSettings_cw5n1h2txyewy |
If you want to block the new Microsoft Edge Specifically, you can add a deny rule by file name, for example: <Deny FriendlyName='C:\\Data\\Programs FileRule' PackageVersion='65535.65535.65535.65535' FileName='msedge.exe' />. This directive will prevent the execution of the indicated binary.
When the app isn't listed, Device Portal is a useful resource. Connect your HoloLens 2, go to Views > Applications, select the app, and locate the PackageRelativeID. Copy what's before the exclamation mark (!) to get the PackageFamilyName, which you can use in WDAC.
Windows Admin Center and WDAC-Applied Environments
WDAC is also used to restrict scripts and enable ConstrainedLanguage in PowerShell, which affects Windows Admin Center (WAC). When you connect to a server or cluster using WDAC, WAC displays the status on the Overview page, for example, whether the PowerShell language is in restricted mode.
Key requirements: standard installation on the host, local administrator rights on host and managed nodes, appropriate network configuration (WinRM HTTP 5985, HTTPS 5986) and SMB access via TCP port 445. It is recommended that WAC and nodes be in the same domain or trusted , especially for authentication and administration.
Regarding policies, there are common cases to consider. Case 1: Only managed nodes enforce WDAC; simply authorize the Microsoft signer in the node's policy. Case 2: Both the WAC host and the node enforce WDAC; you will need to include additional signers (for example, Microsoft 3rd Party Application Component and .NET) on the WAC host.
Examples of signer rules (can be generated using the wizard or PowerShell and then reviewed): <Signer Name='Microsoft Code Signing PCA 2011'><CertRoot Type='TBS' Value='F6F717A43AD9ABDDC8CEFDDE1C505462535E7D1307E630F9544A2D14FE8BF26E' /><CertPublisher Value='Microsoft Corporation' /></Signer>. For case 2, add: <Signer Name='Microsoft Code Signing PCA 2011'><CertRoot Type='TBS' Value='F6F717A43AD9ABDDC8CEFDDE1C505462535E7D1307E630F9544A2D14FE8BF26E' /><CertPublisher Value='Microsoft 3rd Party Application Component' /></Signer> y <Signer Name='Microsoft Code Signing PCA 2011'><CertRoot Type='TBS' Value='F6F717A43AD9ABDDC8CEFDDE1C505462535E7D1307E630F9544A2D14FE8BF26E' /><CertPublisher Value='.NET' /></Signer>.
If you're using WAC versions earlier than 2410, you may not need the '.NET' rule, but you might need specific file or hash rules on the WAC host. For example, allowing WiX libraries: <FileRules><Allow FriendlyName='WiX wixca.dll' Hash='9DE61721326D8E88636F9633AA37FCB885A4BABE' /><Allow FriendlyName='WiX wixca.dll' Hash='B216DFA814FC856FA7078381291C78036CEF0A05' /><Allow FriendlyName='WiX wixca.dll' Hash='233F5E43325615710CA1AA580250530E06339DEF861811073912E8A16B058C69' /><Allow FriendlyName='WiX wixca.dll 2' Hash='EB4CB5FF520717038ADADCC5E1EF8F7C24B27A90' /><Allow FriendlyName='WiX wixca.dll 2' Hash='6C65DD86130241850B2D808C24EC740A4C509D9C' /><Allow FriendlyName='WiX firewall.dll' Hash='2F0903D4B21A0231ADD1B4CD02E25C7C4974DA84' /><Allow FriendlyName='WiX firewall.dll' Hash='868635E434C14B65AD7D7A9AE1F4047965740786' /><Allow FriendlyName='WiX firewall.dll' Hash='5C29B8255ACE0CD94C066C528C8AD04F0F45EBA12FCF94DA7B9CA1B64AD4288B' /></FileRules>. This facilitates installations and modules that WAC needs.
Regarding the PowerShell execution policy, the default is usually sufficient. If you change it, set the 'LocalMachine' scope to 'RemoteSigned' to allow the loading of signed scripts. Make changes only when absolutely necessary and document the risk.
Known issues and troubleshooting
There are some limitations with WDAC. For example, deploying Azure Kubernetes Service on Azure On-premises and bridging Azure Arc resources via WAC are not supported in environments with WDAC . There are also restrictions on single-server RBAC and some certificate tool operations.
If WAC displays 'module not found' or 'could not connect', check if the 'Microsoft.SME.*' modules have been transferred to the node (directory '%PROGRAMFILES%\\WindowsPowerShell\\Modules'). If they are not there, retry the connection. Also, verify that the WAC host has access to the node's TCP port 445 for SMB communication.
Fileless malware, PowerShell, and LOLBins: the perfect context for WDAC abuse
Fileless malware doesn't need to write persistent artifacts to disk to wreak havoc: it executes everything in memory or abuses built-in tools, making it difficult to detect. There have been high-profile cases like the DNC breach in 2016 , and campaigns (for example, from the Lazarus group) have been observed using Word documents to execute code in memory using LOLBins on both Windows and macOS.
Common types of fileless attacks include malicious documents and scripts, abuse of Living Off the Land Binaries (LOLBins), and memory injection techniques. Memory is volatile, so attackers often look for persistence mechanisms to survive reboots.
PowerShell and WMI/CIM are favorites. PowerShell is extremely powerful and flexible, and if input isn't controlled, prompt injections can slip through, leading to remote execution, exfiltration, or privilege escalation . WMI provides a management and subscription layer that can also be exploited for persistence and migration.
Among the tools invoked by attackers for scripting are 'powershell.exe', 'wscript.exe', 'cscript.exe', 'cmd.exe', and 'mshta.exe'. Native binaries such as 'regsvr32.exe', 'rundll32.exe', 'certutil.exe', 'schtasks.exe', 'bitsadmin.exe', 'wmic.exe', 'cmstp.exe', 'msbuild.exe', 'csc.exe', 'netsh.exe', 'curl.exe', and even utilities like Defender's own MpCmdRun.exe are also abused. Their combination allows attackers to download, execute, bypass User Account Control (UAC), move laterally, and attempt to circumvent controls like WDAC.
In memory injection, API calls like 'VirtualAllocEx' and 'WriteProcessMemory' allow one process to write code to another. For obfuscation, there are frameworks like Invoke-Obfuscation or Invoke-DOSfuscation in PowerShell. Obfuscation tools for bash are also available on Linux (e.g., Bashfuscator, SHC, etc.).
To mitigate this: do not open suspicious attachments, harden RDP, enable advanced PowerShell logging (modules, script block, transcription), audit WMI for unusual subscriptions, disable Office macros by policy where applicable, and rely on layered security with network and in-memory detection , in addition to keeping software up to date.
Real-life scenarios: When WDAC blocks legitimate apps (school case)
A common scenario: an IT team wants to block portable browsers and apps not properly installed, but when deploying a test policy in audit mode, they see that legitimate educational software is flagged as a violation and would be blocked if the policy were applied. Even after adding permission rules (e.g., allowing everything on 'C:\\Math'), the event viewer shows blocks.
What's happening: WDAC is, by design, an allowlist technology, and rule precedence is relevant (denies usually win). Furthermore, if there are multiple policies, the most restrictive one prevails. Therefore, allow rules may appear to be ignored if there is another, more restrictive layer or if the source of trust is not well established.
Can WDAC be used in deny list mode only, allowing everything else? This isn't WDAC's native approach and is difficult to maintain in the long run . For more controlled startup, use audit mode, generate an inventory with events, refine rules using publisher-specific rules (when available), hash rules, or catalog rules for apps without a publisher, and consider complementary policies or using Managed Installer/Intune to establish trust.
If the app doesn't have an editor or signed identifiers, consider folder-based rules with compensating controls (strict ACLs, change tracking), although ideally you should migrate to signature-based rules and catalogs. Also, check that the wizard doesn't include overly restrictive templates for your scenario; sometimes starting with a more lenient base and iteratively tightening the rules helps avoid breaking production.
Prompt injection attacks in PowerShell and their relationship with WDAC
Prompt injection attacks manipulate input or context to induce interpreters to execute malicious commands . In PowerShell, this can lead to remote execution, exfiltration, or compromise of service accounts, which is especially serious if WDAC has been previously disabled.
Best practices: principle of least privilege, dedicated accounts and Just Enough Administration (JEA); avoid Invoke Expressions, construct typed arguments, validate and sanitize inputs with whitelists, require script signing, enable AMSI and advanced logging, and use AppLocker or WDAC to restrict execution . In architecture, separate environments, isolate critical processes, implement network controls, and use centralized auditing integrated with SIEM.
In CI/CD pipelines, add SAST, code reviews, and injection-oriented penetration testing. Automate validations that block deployments that don't comply with policies. Specialized companies offer services for designing defenses , hardening, configuring AppLocker/WDAC, advanced logging, and automated responses integrated with SIEM, as well as business intelligence for visualizing risks.
This whole picture paints a scenario where WDAC is both a target and an ally: when attackers manipulate it to silence sensors, the organization loses visibility; when managed wisely, it becomes a solid barrier. The key lies in strengthening the chain of trust (signed and verified policies), monitoring SiPolicy.p7b and DeviceGuard, hardening Defender and EDR, improving PowerShell hygiene, and reducing the attack surface against fileless and LOLBins, relying on telemetry and rigorous change controls.
Table of Contents
- 1 What are WDAC manipulation attacks?
- 2 What's happening and how they operate
- 3 From the Krueger Project to the DreamDemon threat
- 4 Indicators and signs to watch out for
- 5 Repercussions for companies and administrations
- 6 Recommendations and mitigation
- 7 WDAC on HoloLens 2: App control without confusing it with kiosk mode
- 8 Windows Admin Center and WDAC-Applied Environments
- 9 Known issues and troubleshooting
- 10 Fileless malware, PowerShell, and LOLBins: the perfect context for WDAC abuse
- 11 Real-life scenarios: When WDAC blocks legitimate apps (school case)
- 12 Prompt injection attacks in PowerShell and their relationship with WDAC